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SUPERWILL TO THE RESCUE? HOW WASHINGTON'S
STATUTE FALLS SHORT OF BEING A HERO IN THE
FIELD OF TRUST AND PROBATE LAW
Cynthia J. Artura
Abstract: During the 1998 session, the Washington legislature added a provision to
Title I 1 of the Revised Code of Washington that allows for testamentary disposition of certain
nonprobate assets. Although Washington's superwill provision is a pioneer in the field of
probate and trust law, it is too limited in its scope to achieve filly its stated purpose. One of
the statute's stated purposes is to enhance the testator's control over the disposition of
nonprobate property. However, the provision limits the definition of "nonprobate asset" to
include only joint tenant bank accounts with right of survivorship and revocable living trusts.
This Comment argues that Washington took a bold step in the right direction by adopting its
superwill statute, but cut that step short by failing to draft the provision to include all
revocable nonprobate assets. This Comment proposes that the legislature expand the scope of
the statute by redefining the term "nonprobate asset" to include all traditional revocable
nonprobate devices. By permitting testamentary disposition of all revocable nonprobate
devices, the state will provide a tool whereby the testator can better effectuate his or her
intent
In 1998, Washington took a bold step in the field of probate law by
enacting a statute that allows for the testamentary disposition of certain
nonprobate assets.' Commentators refer to such a statute as a "superwill"
provision because it enhances an individual's ability to dispose of his2
nonprobate property without subjecting it to the probate process.
Washington's superwill provision enables a person to alter, pursuant to
his will, the beneficiary designation of revocable living trusts and ofjoint
tenancy bank accounts with right of survivorship.3 While the Washington
legislature took a step in the right direction by adopting a superwill
provision, the statute is troublesome because its definition of nonprobate
asset excludes certain devices, such as life insurance policies and
retirement plans, from its scope. To achieve its intended purpose-to
effectuate the testator's intent-the legislature should amend the statute
by broadening the definition of nonprobate asset to include all
nontestamentary revocable devices.
1. See Wash. Rev. Code ch. 11.11 (1998). Nonprobate assets are also referred to as will
substitutes, which are defined as "[d]ocuments which purportedly accomplish what a will is designed
to accomplish, e.g. trusts, life insurance, joint ownership of property." Black's Law Dictionary 1601
(6th ed. 1990).
2. For clarity's sake, this Comment will use "he," rather than "he or she," for the singular tense.
3. See Wash. Rev. Code ch. 11.11.
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Part I of this Comment describes the emergence of the superwill in the
realm of trust and probate law. Part II explains Washington's superwill
provision and its legislative history. Part III illustrates the necessity of
Washington's superwill statute. However, it also outlines problems with
the state's superwill statute and proposes changes that the legislature
should make to cure its defects. This Comment concludes that the
Washington legislature should broaden the scope of the statute to permit
testamentary disposition of all generally accepted revocable nonprobate
assets.
I. EMERGENCE OF THE SUPERWILL IN TRUST AND
PROBATE LAW
The superwill provision is an important tool in the field of estate
planning because it allows people the option of disposing of their
property either by making testamentary dispositions by wills or by using
nontestamentary devices known as will substitutes.4 The underlying
purpose of trust and probate law is to effectuate the testator's intent,5 and
the superwill debate centers on whether an individual, pursuant to that
purpose, can alter a will substitute in his will. The American Bar
Association considered, but ultimately rejected, a model uniform
superwill provision that would allow an individual to alter the disposition
of nonprobate assets in his will.' Before discussing the superwill
provision, and more particularly the scope of Washington's statute, it is
useful first to understand the difference between probate and nonprobate
property.7 Section A explains the difference between testamentary and
nontestamentary dispositions of property. Section B explains the concept
of a superwill and how it has emerged to facilitate the disposition of
nonprobate assets.
4. See Mark L. Kaufmann, Should the Dead Hand Tighten Its Grasp: An Analysis of the
Superwill, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1019, 1019-20 (1988). For a list of will substitutes, see infra note 31.
5. See Debra Lynch Dubovich, Note, The Blockbuster Will: Effectuating the Testator's Intent to
Change Will Substitute Beneficiaries, 21 Val. U. L. Rev. 719, 738 (1987) ("Effectuating a testator's
clearly manifested intent is a guiding principal frequently cited by courts and reflected in the spirit of
the Uniform Probate Code."). Blockbuster will is another name for superwill.
6. See Kaufmann, supra note 3, at 1021 (discussing American Bar Association's consideration of
uniform superwill provision).
7. Probate property refers to property that passes pursuant to the decedent's will or by intestacy.
See Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 36 (5th ed. 1995).




A. The Roles ofProbate and Nonprobate Property in the Emergence
of the Superwill Provision
1. Testamentary Disposition
A testator may effect a testamentary disposition by making a will.'
The essential characteristic of a will is that, even though an individual
executes it during his lifetime, it has no legal force or operative effect
until the testator's death.9 A court will uphold the validity of a will only
if it deals with one or more of the following: (1) the testator's property,
whether real or personal and whether whole or in part, of which he has
the power to dispose; (2) the appointment by the testator of an executor
to dispose of property at the testator's death in accordance with the terms
of the law and will; and/or (3) the appointment, upon the testator's death,
of a guardian for the testator's minor children.'0
To ensure that the testator's will reflects his intent, the law imposes
requirements with respect to the testator's mental capacity for creating a
valid will." Before a court will declare a document a valid will, the court
must determine that the document expresses the testator's intention and
that the testator had the capacity to execute the document.' 2 It is not
8. See Kaufmnann, supra note 4, at 1019.
9. See I William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills § 1.2, at 3 (1960)
[hereinafter Page on Wills].
J10 See id. § 5.3, at 163-66.
11. See Roger W. Andersen, Understanding Trusts and Estates § 7, at 31 (1994). For a testator to
meet the capacity requirement to execute a will, the testator must be "of sound mind." Id. at 33. The
two instances in which a testator is not of sound mind are when the testator is suffering from a
mental deficiency and when he is operating under an insane delusion. See id. Mental deficiency
refers to the general capacity to make a will, and the court will declare the entire will invalid unless
the testator meets the court's requirement to:
(1) Know the nature and extent of his or her property
(2) Know which persons would be expected to take the property
(3) Understand the basics of the plan for disposing of the property; and
(4) Understand how the above elements interrelate.
Id. (Internal footnote omitted). In contrast, an insane delusion is "a false belief for which there is no
reasonable foundation." Id at 34 (internal quotation omitted). Rather than invalidating the whole
will, a court will invalidate only those provisions of the will that were a product of the insane
delusion. See id
12. See itd at 32-34. A court will focus both on the execution of the will and the meaning of the
words used in the will to determine the testator's intent. See id Showing that the testator had
testamentary intent is rarely a problem when a lawyer has drafted the will, but it may become an
issue when a will is homemade. See id.
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uncommon for an individual to contest a will on the grounds that the
testator lacked the requisite mental capacity or that the testator executed
the will in response to undue influence or fraud. 3 If the contesting party
shows undue influence, the court will strike out only the tainted
provisions of the will. 14 The court will throw out the entire will only if it
determines that the testator produced the will entirely as a result of undue
influence or that the acquired gift is so central to the estate plan that it
collapses without it. 5 If the court concludes that the testator executed the
will as a result of fraud, it will deny probate of the will and may impose a
constructive trust to make the injured party whole.'6
In addition to imposing requirements as to the testator's mental
capacity, every state imposes statutorily mandated rules for executing a
will, known as Statutes of Wills. 7 First, every state now requires that,
except under narrowly defined circumstances, a will must be in writing."
As long as the will is in print, the law is reasonably flexible with respect
to the medium with which it is written and the material on which it is
13. See id. at34-37.
14. See id. at 36.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 36-37. Courts created the constructive trust as an equitable device to prevent unjust
enrichment. See id. at 37. Under a constructive trust, the court requires the titleholder of property to
convey the property to another because he wrongfully acquired or retained it. See Black's Law
Dictionary 314 (6th ed. 1990).
17. See Andersen, supra note 11, at 43. The Uniform Probate Code provides that a will must be:
(1) in writing;
(2) signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's
conscious presence and by the testator's direction; and
(3) signed by at least two individuals, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he [or
she] witnessed either the signing of the will ... or in the testator's acknowledgement of that
signature or acknowledgement of the will.
Uniform Probate Code § 2-502 (1990) (alteration in original). Washington enacted a Statute of Wills
that imposes the same requirements as the Uniform Probate Code. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.12.020
(1998).
18. See Uniform Probate Code § 2-502 (1990); Wash. Rev. Code § 11.12.020 ("Every will shall
be in writing."); Thomas E. Atkinson, Law of Wills § 63, at 294 (2d ed. 1953). The exceptions are for
nuncupative and military testaments. See id. A nuncupative will is "[a]n oral will declared or
dictated by the testator in his last sickness before a sufficient number of witnesses, and afterwards
reduced to writing." Black's Law Dictionary 1069 (6th ed. 1990). A military testament is defined as
"a nuncupative will, that is one made by word of mouth, by which a soldier may dispose of his
goods, pay, and other personal chattels, without the forms and solemnities which the law requires in
other cases." Id. at 1474. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 11.12.025 (permitting military testaments).
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written.19 A will may be in any language and need not be in a language
the testator understood, provided that he understood the contents of the
will.2" Second, a will must be signed by the testator.2 However, courts
are liberal in determining what is a sufficient signature.' Most states will
even allow someone else to sign on behalf of the testator.' Finally, two
competent and disinterested individuals must witness and sign the will
while in the testator's presence.24
States require testators to comply with Statutes of Wills for four
principal reasons.' First, by requiring a level of ceremony, Statutes of
Wills serve a ritual, or cautionary, function by impressing upon the
testator the significance of his statements. This permits the court to
determine that the testator intended the court to give such statements
legal effect.26 Second, it serves an evidentiary function by preserving
evidence so that the court can be confident it has reliable information
regarding the testator's intent.27 Third, these formalities serve a
protective function by safeguarding the testator, at the time of executing
the will, from undue influence and fraud.28 Finally, the Statutes of Wills
serve a channeling function by requiring a testator to use similar forms,
19. See Atkinson, supra note 18, at 294-95 ("[A] will may be typewritten, or written with pencil,
or partly in ink and partly in pencil, or partly printed on a legal blank. A lower court decision to the
effect that a will written on a slate is invalid has been disapproved.") (footnotes omitted).
20. See id. at 296.
21. Seei. at297.
22. See id. ("A will must be signed by the testator, but he need not write his fill or correct name,
and even a mark or stamp is sufficient if that was the complete act with which the testator intended
to authenticate the instrument.").
23. See Andersen, supra note 11, at 47. See also, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 11.12.020 (1998).
("Every will shall be ... signed by the testator or by some other person under the testator's direction
in the testator's presence.").
24. See Andersen, supra note 11, at 47-50. The courts have struggled with what the term
"presence" means, and they generally follow either a "line-of-sight" test or, more commonly, a
"conscious presence" test. Id. at 47-48. Under the line of sight test, the testator must be able to see
the witness while the witness is signing the will. See id. at 48. Under the conscious presence test,
"[i]f [the witnesses] are so near at hand that they are within the range of any of [the testator's]
senses, so that he knows what is going on, the requirement has been met" Id. at 47-48 (footnote
omitted) (second and third alterations in original).
25. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 7, at 205-07; see also Andersen, supra note 11, at
44.
26. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 7, at 205-07.
27. See id.
28. See id.
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features, and procedures which provides him with greater assurance that
the court will carry out his wishes.29
2. Nontestamentary Disposition
An alternative to disposition of one's assets by will is disposition of
property through the use of will substitutes.3" Will substitutes are
"documents which purportedly accomplish what a will is designed to
accomplish,"'" which is to declare how an individual intends to dispose
of his property when he dies.32 Until fairly recently, courts did not
validate will substitutes because the law permitted property to pass upon
the testator's death only by intestate succession or by a validly executed
will.33 Presently, every state recognizes the inherent validity of will
substitutes as a means to dispose of assets at death.34 While there are
many different types of will substitutes, they all share a common legal
29. See id.
30. The use of will substitutes allows a decedent to achieve a nontestamentary disposition of his
estate. See Kaufmann, supra note 4, at 1019.
31. Black's Law Dictionary 1601 (6th ed. 1990). A substantially complete list of will substitutes is
as follows:
(1) joint tenancies either in real or personal property, (2) tenancies by the entireties, (3)
homestead rights and exemptions, (4) partnership survivorship agreements, (5) joint bank
accounts with provisions for survivorship, (6) government savings bonds payable to alternative
payees, (7) government savings bonds payable to a named person and upon his death to a named
survivor, (8) bank account trusts, commonly known as Totten trusts after the first case that gave
them recognition, (9) regular inter vivos trusts with powers, including that of revocation,
reserved, (10) deeds creating future interests, such as an executory interest to take effect at the
grantor's death or creating a remainder in the grantee with a life estate reserved in the grantor,
(11) deeds unconditionally delivered to an escrow to be delivered to the grantee at the grantor's
death, (12) promissory notes, given for consideration, payable at or after the maker's death, (13)
life insurance contracts, (14) life insurance trusts, (15) annuity contracts and retirement
programs with survivorship provisions, (16) gifts causa mortis, (17) gifts absolute, particularly
those made in contemplation of death but with death not made a condition, (18) contracts of all
kinds and of infinite variety in which the obligation owed by one party is not due until his death
or the death of the other party, including leases, releases, employment contracts, retirement
programs of all types, third party beneficiary contracts, contracts to make wills, and the like.
Page on Wills, supra note 9, § 6.1, at 219.
32. See Black's Law Dictionary 1598 (6th ed. 1990).
33. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 721. Intestacy is defined as "the state or condition of dying
without having made a valid will, or without having disposed by will of a part of his property."
Black's Law Dictionary 821 (6th ed. 1990).
34. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 721.
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characteristic-the assets disposed of by a will substitute do not become
part of the testator's probate estate.35
Will substitutes benefit both testators and beneficiaries.36 Will
substitutes simplify the disposition of testators' estates by allowing
testators to avoid the formalities of will execution required by the
Statutes of Wills.37 Will substitutes also enable beneficiaries to avoid the
delays and costs of probate and protect the assets from creditor claims.3"
Finally, the use of will substitutes avoids delays in beneficiaries' receipt
of title and possession of the property.39 While the disposition of probate
assets can entail a complicated process taking up to one year,
beneficiaries generally receive nonprobate property shortly after the
decedent's death.'
The five most commonly used will substitutes are revocable living
trusts, joint tenancies, life insurance policies, pension and employee
benefit plans, and multiple party bank accounts.41 First, revocable living
trusts are the most flexible will substitutes because a donor has the ability
to draft the dispositive and administrative provisions according to his
wishes.42 While granting the trustee legal title to the property, the trustor
generally retains the right to the income of the trust for life as well as the
35. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall & Anthony 3. Aiello, The Superwill Debate: Opening the
Pandora's Box?, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 277, 278 (1989). When assets are part of a testator's probate
estate, they must go through the process of probate, which is a
[c]ourt procedure by which a will is proved to be valid or invalid; though in current usage this
term has been expanded to generally refer to the legal process wherein the estate of a decedent is
administered. Generally, the probate process involves collecting the decedent's assets,
liquidating liabilities, paying necessary taxes, and distributing property to heirs.
Black's Law Dictionary 1202 (6th ed. 1990); see also John H. Langbein, The Nonprobative
Revolution and Future of Law of Succession, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1108, 1117 (1984) ('Probate
performs three essential functions: (1) making property owned at death marketable again (title
clearing); (2) paying off the decedent's debts (creditor protection); and (3) implementing the
decedent's donative intent respecting the property that remains once the claims of creditors have
been discharged (distribution)."); Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 7, at 41 (citing same three
functions that probate serves).
36. See Kaufmann, supra note 4, at 1020; Page on Wills, supra note 9, § 6.1, at 217.
37. See Kaufinann, supra note 4, at 1020; see also supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
38. See Kaufinann, supra note 4, at 1020 n.8.
39. See Page on Wills, supra note 9, § 6.1, at 217.
40. See id.
41. See Kwall & Aiello, supra note 35, at 282.
42. See Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 7, at 344.
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power to amend, alter, or revoke the trust in accordance with its terms.43
A second common type of nonprobate asset is a joint tenancy.' Joint
tenancies allow two or more individuals to own an undivided equal
interest in property.45 When one joint tenant dies, his property interests
pass immediately to the remaining joint tenants in equal shares.' Third,
life insurance policies are contracts that entitle designated beneficiaries
to receive specified sums upon the insured's death.47 Life insurance
policy beneficiary designations, like wills, are revocable.48 However,
contract law, rather than the law of wills, governs because life insurance
policies are nontestamentary transfers.49 When the insured dies, the
insurance company pays the policy's assets to the designated
beneficiary." A fourth type of will substitute that circumvents the
Statutes of Wills includes pension and employee benefit plans.5' Finally,
people commonly use multiple-party bank accounts, which transfer
ownership of funds from the depositor to the beneficiaries upon the
depositor's death. 2
43. See Kwall & Aiello, supra note 35, at 283. See also, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600,
604 (Ill. 1955) ("[Rletention by the settlor of the power to revoke, even when coupled with the
reservation of a life interest in the trust property, does not render the trust inoperative for want of
execution as a will.").
44. See Kwall & Aiello, supra note 35, at 282.
45. See Joseph William Singer, Property Law 709 (2d ed. 1997).
46. See id. In some jurisdictions, a benefit of this form of property ownership is that creditors
cannot seize a joint tenant's share after he has died because his share vanishes upon death. See
Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 7, at 340. In Washington, however, the law does not shield joint
tenancy property from creditors' claims. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.18.200 (1995).
47. See Black's Law Dictionary 805 (6th ed 1990).
48. See Kwall & Aiello, supra note 35, at 282.
49. See Andersen, supra note 11, at 119.
50. See id.
51. See Kwall & Aiello, supra note 35, at 282.
52. See id. These accounts take one of three forms: (1) joint bank accounts, (2) Totten trusts, and
(3) Payable On Death (P.O.D.) accounts. See id. at 286. A joint account is "[ain account (e.g. bank
or brokerage account) in two or more names." Black's Law Dictionary 837 (6th ed. 1990). A Totten
trust is a "[d]evice used to pass property in a bank account after depositor's death to designated
person through vehicle of trust rather than through process of probate." Id. at 1513. A P.O.D.
account is "an account payable on request to one person during lifetime and on his death to one or
more P.O.D. payees, or to one or more persons during their lifetimes and on the death of all of them
to one or more P.O.D. payees." Id. at 1155.
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B. Superwill Statute
Because the law recognizes both testamentary and nontestamentary
dispositions, commentators and legislators have sought to provide
increased flexibility to testators in the disposition of nonprobate
property. 3 The American Bar Association (ABA) considered, but
ultimately rejected, a proposed model uniform superwill provision.: In
addition, many jurisdictions have contemplated enacting superwill
statutes to provide that flexibility, but only Washington has adopted such
a provision5
The superwill permits a testator to "change the conditions and
provisions of will substitutes through the use of a testamentary
instrument."' 6 Rather than requiring the testator to follow the established
procedures for changing the terms of a will substitute, 7 the superwill
statute permits a testator to make those changes in his will. 8 The
superwill statute simplifies the disposition of an estate by permitting a
testator to dispose of both probate and nonprobate assets through one
instrument.5
9
The superwill statute provides a means for resolving some of the
problems that ensue from the use of nonprobate devices and, thus, helps
to effectuate the testator's intent.' Many individuals who use will
substitutes fail to realize that the requirements for altering the terms of a
will substitute differ from those for altering a will.6 They believe that
they can use their wills to alter the terms of their will substitutes, when in
reality, probate courts do not have jurisdiction over nonprobate
transfers.6 2 Unfortunately, testators often cannot correct those mistakes
53. See Kwall & Aiello, supra note 35, at 277.
54. See Kaufmann, supra note 4, at 1021-22.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. An individual must adhere to the instructions in the will substitute for making a valid change
to the will substitute's terms. See infra note 63.
58. See Kwall & Aiello, supra note 35, at 277; Kaufinann, supra note 4, at 1020.
59. See Kwall & Aiello, supra note 35, at 277; Kaufmann, supra note 4, at 1020.
60. See Kaufinann, supra note 4, at 1020.
61. See id. at 1021.
62. See Andersen, supra note 11, at 123.
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because no one discovers them prior to the testators' deaths and the
submission of their wills for probate.
63
The case of Cook v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States' illustrates this point. Mr. Cook, the testator, attempted to change
the beneficiary designation on his life insurance policy through a
holographic will.6 Refusing to honor Mr. Cook's clearly expressed
intent, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision to
grant summary judgment in favor of Cook's ex-wife, the named
beneficiary of the policy.6 Although the insured wanted the proceeds
from the policy to go to his new wife and son,67 the court refused to carry
out his intent because he failed to comply with the policy's terms for
changing the beneficiary.68
In cases like Cook, in which the testator attempts to change the
beneficiary designation of his life insurance policy but fails to comply
with the terms of the policy, many courts resort to the doctrine of
substantial compliance to effectuate the testator's intent.69 For example,
in Rice v. Life Insurance Co. of North America,70 the Washington Court
of Appeals stated that when an insured attempts to change his beneficiary
designation, but fails to follow the required procedure, a court of equity
will give effect to his intentions if he has substantially complied with the
terms of the policy regarding the change.7' The court stated that
"[s]ubstantial compliance with the terms of the policy means that the
insured has not only manifested an intent to change beneficiaries, but has
done everything which was reasonably possible to make that change. 72
63. See, e.g., Cook v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 428 N.E.2d 110 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981) (stating that attempt to change beneficiary of life insurance contract by will and in
disregard of methods prescribed under contract shall be unsuccessful).
64. Id.
65. See id. at 112; Dukeminier & Johanson, supra note 7, at 248 ("A holographic will is a will
written by the testator's hand and signed by the testator; attesting witnesses are not required.").
66. See Cook, 428 N.E.2d at 110.
67. See id. at 112.
68. See id. at 111. The provision in the policy stated that the owner could change the beneficiary
"by written notice to the Society, but any such change shall be effective only if it is endorsed on this
policy by the Society." Id.; see also Uniform Probate Code § 6-101 (1990) (providing that if contract
permits owner to change beneficiary by will, owner may do so, but is silent on power to change
beneficiary by will if not granted in policy).
69. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 739.
70. 25 Wash. App. 479, 609 P.2d 1387 (1980).
71. See id. at 482, 609 P.2d at 1389.
72. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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The Cook court, also relying on the doctrine of substantial
compliance, noted that it would have recognized Cook's attempt to
change the beneficiary of the life insurance policy if he had substantially
complied with the terms of the policy in making that change.73 The court
did not recognize Cook's attempt to change the beneficiary of his life
insurance policy based on its determination that Cook did not do
everything reasonably possible to effect the change according to the
terms of the policy.74 Cook did nothing, other than execute a holographic
will, to change the beneficiary despite the fact that he had ample time
and opportunity to notify the insurance company of the change during
the fourteen years after his divorce.75 Having determined that Cook had
not substantially complied with the terms of the policy, the court refused
to effectuate his intent as reflected in his will.
76
Despite the inequities in cases like Cook, superwills are not
universally accepted as valid tools for altering the disposition of
nonprobate assets.77 With the exception of Washington, states have been
reluctant to enact superwill statutes.78 The ABA considered the adoption
of a uniform superwill provision that would allow testators to control the
disposition and revocation of nonprobate assets pursuant to their wills,
but ultimately rejected the proposal.79 Some commentators oppose the
superwill on the theory that a testator should be able to use a will only to
dispose of those assets that he owns at death. 0 It is argued that a device
disposing of nonprobate assets is nontestamentary in nature, and thus,
passes a present interest to the beneficiary." This is unlike a will, which
passes no interest to the beneficiary until the testator's death. 2 It is
further argued that to the extent the testator, during his life, has passed a
present interest in a nonprobate asset to the recipient, the testator no
longer owns that interest and cannot dispose of it in a subsequently
executed will.8
73. See Cook, 428 N.E.2d at 115.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 116.
76. See id.
77. See Kaufinann, supra note 4, at 1021.
78. See iU; see also Wash. Rev. Code ch. 11.11 (1998).
79. See Kaufinann, supra note 4, at 1021.
80. See Kwall & Aiello, supra note 35, at 289.
81. See id.
82. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
83. See Kwall & Aiello, supra note 35, at 289.
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Farkas v. Williams' held that a transfer is testamentary and can only
be made pursuant to a will unless it passes a present interest.85 In Farkas,
the court had to consider whether the beneficiary acquired a present
interest in certain trusts before the court could determine if the trusts
were valid.86 If the court determined that the beneficiary acquired no
present interest, the transfer would be testamentary and valid only if
made pursuant to a will." The court held that the beneficiary of four
revocable living trust instruments acquired an interest in the subject
matter of the trusts upon their creation.88 Although the court noted that
the trusts would be testamentary if the grantor passed no interest to the
beneficiary before dying, it concluded that the grantor gave the
beneficiary a present inter vivos interest in the trust property.89 While the
court conceded that it was difficult to name the beneficiary's present
interest, it reasoned that putting a label on the interest was not necessary
as long as the beneficiary acquired it upon the creation of the trusts.9°
The court determined that "[t]he declaration of trust immediately creates
an equitable interest in the beneficiaries, . . . although the interest may be
divested by the exercise of the power of revocation."' The court further
concluded that the grantor's power of revocation "shows a vested
interest, subject to divestment, and not the lack of any interest at all."92
While Farkas reflects the view of many courts and legislatures, some
commentators have argued that to the extent a nonprobate device is
revocable, it has no practical difference from a will.93 They have argued
that it is not logical to emphasize the distinction between testamentary
and nontestamentary transfers because such a distinction relies on the
fiction that nonprobate assets create a present interest in the recipient
despite the fact that the grantor may exercise his power to revoke the
transfer at any time. 9' They disagree with the view that the grantor's
retained power to revoke renders the beneficiary's interest vested, subject
84. 125 N.E.2d 600 (Il. 1955).
85. See id.
86. See id. at 602- 03.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 603.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 605 (internal quotations omitted).
92. Id. at 608.




to divestment.95 Instead, these commentators advance the theory that
revocable nonprobate dispositions create no more of a present interest in
their intended beneficiaries than do expectancies under wills, because
they are subject to being eliminated if the creator exercises his retained
power to revoke.96
II. WASHINGTON'S SUPERWILL STATUTE
A. Explanation of Washington's Superwill Provision
During its 1998 session, the Washington legislature passed the
Testamentary Disposition of Nonprobate Assets Act.' The legislature
intended this statute to serve the following three purposes:
(1) Enhance and facilitate the power of testators to control the
disposition of assets that pass outside their wills;
(2) Provide simple procedures for resolution of disputes regarding
entitlement to such assets; and
(3) Protect any financial institution or other third party having
possession of or control over such an asset transferring it to a
beneficiary duly designated by the testator, unless the third party
has been provided notice of a testamentary disposition as required
in this chapter.98
The superwill provision allows an individual to alter the disposition of
his nonprobate assets pursuant to his will. Thus, he must comply with
Washington's Statute of Wills just as if he were disposing of probate
property under his will. 9 The superwill statute facilitates disposition of
95. See id at 290.
96. See Id. at 290; Langbein, supra note 35, at 1128 (stating that it is only form of words that
distinguishes beneficiary's interest under will from beneficiary's interest under will substitute).
97. 1998 Wash. Laws 292 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code ch. 11.11 (1998)).
98. Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.003 (explaining purposes of superwill provision). The drafters
stated that the primary goals of the statute are to enable testators to integrate their estate plans more
easily, to permit the modification of beneficiary designations and other nonprobate asset
arrangements through a will, and to provide protection to third parties who control the assets after
the owner's death. The procedures for providing notice to such third parties are intended to be
simple enough to avoid those disputes or, in the alternative, to expedite their resolution. See
Comments to Testamentary Disposition of Nonprobate Assets Provisions § 11.11.020 (unpublished)
(on file with author).
99. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 738.
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nonprobate assets by enabling a testator to alter the beneficiary
designation of joint tenant bank accounts with right of a survivorship
pursuant to his will.0 While enhancing a testator's power to dispose of
his nonprobate assets, the statute protects financial institutions by
limiting their liability when they disburse the nonprobate assets pursuant
to the terms of the testator's will rather than the terms of the will
substitute. 10'
Although the superwill provision permits testators to dispose of their
"nonprobate" assets through their wills,'02 the legislature defined
"nonprobate asset" narrowly.0 3 For purposes of the superwill statute, the
legislature incorporated the definition of nonprobate asset as set out in
RCW § 11.02.005(15), which defines a nonprobate asset as an interest in
real property that passes under a joint tenancy with right of survivorship,
a conveyance that passes upon the death of the owner, property passing
under a community property agreement, an individual retirement account
or bond, a revocable living trust, or a joint tenant bank account with right
of survivorship.' However, the legislature excluded the following from
the definition of nonprobate asset in the superwill provision:
(i) A right or interest in real property passing under a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship;
(ii) A deed or conveyance for which possession has been
postponed until the death of the owner;
(iii) A right or interest passing under a community property
agreement; and
100. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.1 1.010(7)(a).
101. SeeWash. Rev. Code § 11.11.040.
102. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.020 (allowing disposition of nonprobate assets under will).
103. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.1 1.0 10(7)(a).
104. Wash. Rev. Code § 11.02.005(15) states:
Nonprobate asset means those rights and interests of a person having beneficial ownership of an
asset that pass on the person's death under a written instrument or arrangement other than the
person's will. Nonprobate asset includes, but is not limited to, a right or interest passing under a
joint tenancy with right of survivorship, joint bank account with right of survivorship, payable
on death or trust bank account, transfer on death security or security account, deed or
conveyance if possession has been postponed until the death of the person, trust of which the
person is grantor and that becomes effective or irrevocable only upon the person's death,
community property agreement, individual retirement account or bond, or note or other contract
the payment or performance of which is affected by the death of the person.
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(iv) An individual retirement account or bond.105
The statute does not apply to real property joint tenancies or to future
interest deeds due to the drafters' concerns regarding real estate title
records." 6 The drafters explain that the statute also excludes property
interests passing under community property agreements because trans-
fers under community property agreements supersede any disposition by
will or will substitute. 7
B. Positive Aspects of Washington's Superwill Statute
The Washington legislature became a pioneer in the field of probate
law by enacting the first superwill provision. Although some states
permit testators to alter terms of nonprobate assets pursuant to a will,
they do so based on already-established doctrines such as substantial
compliance!0 Rather than hide behind these existing doctrines to
effectuate the testator's intent, Washington State chose to take the bold
next step in the evolution of probate law by passing a superwill statute. 9
The superwill provision helps to effectuate the testator's intent, which
is one of the fundamental purposes underlying probate law.1 While
most jurisdictions prohibit an individual from changing the beneficiary
designation of a joint tenant bank account with right of survivorship by
executing a subsequent will,1 Washington's superwill provision allows
such a change.' In this respect, the superwill provision helps to "ensure
that the testator's clearly manifested last wishes were fulfilled because,
105. Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.010(7)(a).
106. See Comments to Testamentary Dispositions of Nonprobate Assets Provisions § 11.11.040
(unpublished) (on file with author).
107. See id.
108. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
109. Wash.Rev. Code ch. 11.11.
110. See Dubovich, supra note 5.
If possible, a will should be interpreted according to its terms viewed in the light of the general
circumstances surrounding the testator in order to effectuate his intention.... The rules of
construction should be flexibly applied so as not to defeat such intention as may be manifested
in the will, and in order to reach an equitable result in accordance with the policies of the law.
Atkinson, supra note 18, § 146, at 807. Even when the decedent dies intestate, the court will apply
an intestacy statute that is intended to carry out the likely intent of the decedent. "The primary
policy, of course, is to carry out the probable intent of the average intestate decedent" Dukeminier
& Johanson, supra note 7, at 70.
111. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 727.
112. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.010.
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by definition, a [superwill] is a more recent indication of a testator's final
intent than the will substitute being amended."' 13 Because testators are
often unfamiliar with the differences among the legal doctrines that
accompany the various nonprobate devices they use to transfer wealth at
death," 4 they often attempt to alter the disposition of nonprobate assets
pursuant to a will." 5 In most states, such attempts are futile because the
courts will not effectuate the testator's intent if he failed to comply fully
with the state's Statute of Wills or the regulatory scheme of the will
substitute."1 6 Washington's superwill provision eliminates this unfortu-
nate result when a testator alters the disposition of assets in a joint tenant
bank account with right of survivorship pursuant to his will."7
The superwill provision is a reliable means of effectuating the
testator's intent. 8 Under the superwill provision, a testator must comply
with Washington's Statute of Wills just as if he were disposing of
probate assets under a will."9 Because the testator must abide by
Washington's Statute of Wills to use a superwill, there is sufficient
protection against fraud, undue influence, and mental incapacity. 2
The superwill also provides a convenient method for changing the
beneficiary of nonprobate property. 2 ' Instead of changing each will
substitute separately, a supdrwill provision permits a testator to execute
one instrument to effect changes in the distribution of both probate and
nonprobate assets.' Certain will substitutes impose onerous require-
ments that must be met before the owner can effectively change any of
113. Dubovich, supra note 5, at 738.
114. See Andersen, supra note 11, at 123.
115. See, e.g., In re Schaech's Will, 31 N.W.2d 614 (Wis. 1948) (stating that testator
inappropriately tried to use will to change title to nonprobate assets).
116. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
117. See Wash. Rev. Code ch. 11.11.
118. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 738.
119. See id. For a discussion of the Statute of Wills, see supra notes 17-24 and accompanying
text.
120. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 738.
121. See id See also Kwall & Aiello, supra note 35, at 279, and supra notes 30-52 and
accompanying text, for a discussion of will substitutes.
122. See Dubovich, supra note 35, at 279. Having a superwill provision would avoid a result like
that in Damon v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 23 Wash. App. 877, 880-81, 598 P.2d 780, 782 (1979). In
Damon, the court stated: "Where a life insurance policy reserves the right in the insured to change
the beneficiary, the change of beneficiary must be made in the manner and mode prescribed by the




its terms.'m  Washington's superwill provision diminishes the
inconvenience that such requirements impose, particularly when multiple
will substitutes are altered. In addition, the superwill option is useful to a
person on his deathbed who wants to change the beneficiary designation
of a joint tenant bank account with right of survivorship, but is unable to
follow the terms of the will substitute for making such a change.'24
Finally, the superwill is the next logical step in the evolution of the
law governing estate planning."z Initially, courts viewed will substitutes
as invalid transfers of property because they did not comply with Statutes
of Wills. 26 Driven by the principle that the testator's intent should
prevail, courts began to recognize these dispositions by applying existing
doctrines and characterizing will substitutes as trusts, joint tenancies, and
gifts.27 Ultimately, courts stopped using these in-direct methods to
effectuate the transferor's intent and accepted the inherent validity of will
substitutes. 121
The history of the superwill is following the same course as that of
will substitutes. 129 Courts initially denied the validity of the superwill,
and now many effectuate the testator's intent by utilizing doctrines such
as substantial compliance. 3 ' While the use of these doctrines can achieve
the same result as a superwill, the intended beneficiary is at the mercy of
the court in each particular case.' The next logical step is to create
consistency and certainty in the law by validating the use of a superwill
for the disposal of nonprobate assets.3 2 Rather than hide behind already-
established doctrines to effect the result of a superwill, the Washington
legislature has taken the next step by enacting a superwill statute.
123. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 738.
124. See Andersen, supra note 11, at 124.
125. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 739; Kaufinann, supra note 4, at 1023.
126. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
127. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 739; Kaufmann, supra note 4, at 1023.
128. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
129. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 739; Kaufinann, supra note 4, at 1023-24.




C. The Washington Legislature's Response to Critics' Concerns
In addition to promoting convenience, reliability, and consistent
effectuation of the testator's intent, Washington's superwill statute also
preserves the benefits of using will substitutes.' Although opponents of
the superwill argue that the implementation of such a provision
eliminates any advantages that will substitutes can provide, that
argument is based on the false premise that superwills automatically
subject all assets to the probate process. 3 ' In reality, a state can
overcome this hurdle simply by maintaining the distinction between
probate assets and will substitutes in the superwill statute itself.'35
Washington's superwill statute does this by providing that nonprobate
assets distributed to testamentary beneficiaries pursuant to a superwill do
not become part of the decedent's probate estate for any purpose other
than validating the beneficiary designation under the superwill.'36 The
drafters state that the will does not actually dispose of the nonprobate
asset.' Rather, it modifies only the beneficiary designation or other
nonprobate asset arrangement.1
38
Washington's superwill statute also enhances testators' flexibility to
dispose of their nonprobate assets without delaying the dispersal of those
assets.' Opponents of the superwill incorrectly argue that a superwill
provision will impede financial intermediaries that handle will substitutes
by preventing quick payout. 40 This argument, like the argument that
superwill provisions eliminate advantages of using will substitutes, is
based on the flawed premise that the nonprobate assets distributed
through the superwill become part of the probate estate.'' As the
Washington legislature has illustrated in its superwill provision, a state
legislature can defeat the premise of this argument by providing in its
133. See Wash. Rev. Code ch. 11.11 (1998).
134. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 734; Kaufmann, supra note 4, at 1027-28.
135. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 734; Kaufinann, supra note 4, at 1027-28.
136. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.080.
137. See Comments to Testamentary Disposition of Nonprobate Assets Provisions § 11.11.100
(unpublished) (on file with author).
138. See id.
139. See Wash. Rev. Code ch. 11.11.
140. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 735; Kaufmann, supra note 4, at 1028-29.
141. See Dubovich, supra note 5, at 735; Kaufnann, supra note 4, at 1028-29.
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superwill statute that assets passing through a superwill do not become
part of the probate estate.142
By enacting a superwill statute that provides protection to financial
institutions and other third-party holders of will substitutes, 143 the
Washington legislature dispelled the concern that a superwil provision
would expose financial intermediaries to potential liability. 44 The statute
states that unless the financial institution holding the nonprobate asset
has actual knowledge of a testamentary beneficiary's claim to the
nonprobate asset, the financial institution can rely entirely upon the terms
of the will substitute arrangement in effect on the date of the owner's
death. 45 This means that if the financial institution is not aware of any
testamentary beneficiary, it can rely on what the will substitute states and
disburse the nonprobate assets accordingly, without checking to see if the
owner had executed a superwill to change the beneficiary designation."4
To provide additional security to financial institutions, the drafters of
the statute also provided that the holder of the will substitute must
receive written notice to have actual knowledge that there is a
testamentary claim for the assets. 147 Unless the holder has actual
knowledge, it can transfer the asset to the beneficiary named under the
terms of the will substitute without the risk of incurring liability. 4 The
transfer of the assets constitutes a complete release and discharge of the
financial institution or third-party holder. 149 RCW 11.11.050 explains the
notice requirements to which the testamentary beneficiary must
adhere.' Subsection one requires the testamentary beneficiary to serve
the financial institution or other third party holding the nonprobate
property with written notice of his claim.' The beneficiary must serve
the notice personally or by certified mail, return receipt requested and
142. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.080.
143. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.040.
144. See Comments to Testamentary Disposition of Nonprobate Assets Provisions §§ 11.11.060-
080 (unpublished) (on file with author).
145. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.040.
146. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.040.
147. See Comments to Testamentary Disposition of Nonprobate Assets Provisions § 11.11.070
(unpublished) (on file with author).
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.050.
151. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.050(1) (stating different notice requirements based on how
asset was held).
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postage prepaid."2 Subsection two provides the required form of the
notice and states that each asset "must be described with reasonable
specificity."'53 Under subsection four, the claimant may provide written
notice anytime after the owner's death as long as the claimant provides it
before the discharge of the personal representative at the closing of the
estate. '54
The legislature also limited financial institutions' exposure to liability
by drafting the provision to state that financial institutions are not
obligated to disburse the nonprobate asset to the testamentary beneficiary
until they have actual knowledge of the testamentary beneficiary's claim
and have received written consent from the personal representative of the
owner's estate. 5 1 If, however, a dispute exists between the beneficiaries
named in the will substitute and the testamentary beneficiaries concern-
ing the ownership of the nonprobate property, the statute does not require
financial institution to transfer the nonprobate property.'56 Without
liability, financial institutions may notify the interested parties in writing
of the institutions' uncertainty as to who owns the property and refuse to
transfer the property until either: "(a) All the beneficiaries, testamentary
beneficiaries, and other interested persons have consented in writing to
the transfer; or (b) The transfer is authorized or directed by a court of
proper jurisdiction.""'
Additionally, any argument that a state should not adopt the superwill
because it creates the potential for "blind disposition" of the testator's
nonprobate assets, contrary to the testator's intent,'58 fails to take into
account that the testator intended only to revoke the beneficiary
designation. When a testator uses a superwill to revoke the beneficiary
152. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.050(1).
153. Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.050(2). "FOR ACCOUNTS AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
THE WRITTEN NOTICE MUST SPECIFY THE OFFICE AT WHICH THE ACCOUNT WAS
MAINTAINED, THE NAME OR NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNT WAS HELD, AND THE
FULL ACCOUNT NUMBER. FOR ASSETS HELD IN TRUST, THE WRITTEN NOTICE MUST
SPECIFY THE NAME OR NAMES OF THE GRANTOR, THE NAME OF THE TRUST, IF ANY,
AND THE DATE OF THE TRUST INSTRUMENT." Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.050(2).
154. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.050(4).
155. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.090.
156. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.100(1).
157. Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11. 100(1).
158. See Kaufmann, supra note 4, at 1029-30. Blind disposition refers to the disposition of the
testator's assets in a manner the testator never intended. It is argument that this will occur if the
testator creates a superwill that negates the disposition of assets in a will substitute without leaving
instructions as to how he wants the assets disbursed. See id.
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designation of nonprobate assets without specifying how he wants those
assets distributed, passage of the assets through the residuary clause of
the testator's will is not necessarily contrary to his intent."9 The
testator's failure to name an alternate beneficiary may be a reflection of
his intent for it to pass through the residuary clause of the will. The
Washington legislature responded to this criticism, like the others, by
drafting the superwill statute to allay such concerns.
III. PROBLEMS WITH WASHINGTON'S SUPERWILL STATUTE
AND PROPOSED CHANGES TO CURE THOSE DEFECTS
A. The Washington Legislature Drafted the Superwill Statute Too
Narrowly
Although Washington took a step in the right direction by adopting a
superwill statute, it defined the term "nonprobate asset"' too narrowly.
While the comments explain why the drafters excluded real property
joint tenancies, future interest deeds, and community property
agreements from the scope of the statute, it fails to delineate their reasons
for excluding the majority of revocable nontestamentary devices."' By
limiting the definition of "nonprobate asset" to include only joint tenant
bank accounts with right of survivorship and revocable living trusts,'62
the legislature enacted a provision that fails to effectuate fully the intent
of the testator. Among the purposes of the superwill statute, the
legislators listed first their intent to "[e]nhance and facilitate the power of
testators to control the disposition of assets that pass outside their
wills."'6 Although this purpose comports with the general goal of
probate law to effectuate the intent of the testator," the legislature did
not draft the statute broadly enough to meet that purpose.
159. See ia at 1030.
160. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.010(7)(a) (defining nonprobate asset).
161. See Comments to Testamentary Disposition of Nonprobate Assets Provisions § 11.11.040
(unpublished) (on file with author).
162. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text for an explanation of joint tenant property
and revocable living trusts.
163. Wash. Rev. Code§ 11.11.003(1).
164. See Atkinson, supra note 18, at 807; see also Dubovich, supra note 5, at 738 ("Effectuating a
testator's clearly manifested intent is a guiding principal frequently cited by the courts and reflected
in the spirit of the Uniform Probate Code.").
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A simple hypothetical illustrates the limitations of a superwill
provision that does not encompass all nonprobate assets. Alice, a
Washington resident, named her parents as beneficiaries of her life
insurance policy and pension. She later decided that she wanted to
appoint her sister, Betsy, as the beneficiary of both nonprobate assets
because her sister was in need of money to fund her medical practice in a
third-world country. After consulting an attorney, Alice realized that she
could not change the beneficiary designations of her life insurance policy
and pension by making a provision in her will because the superwill
statute does not apply to those nonprobate assets. Rather, she was told
that she had to fill out two sets of paperwork to change the beneficiary
designations and send them to the companies dealing with those assets.
Unfortunately, Alice was uncertain of whom to call to request the
paperwork. Although Alice spent a considerable amount of time trying to
determine whom to contact, she was unsuccessful in her efforts and did
not request the paperwork before she died in a car accident. Because
Alice never requested and submitted the paperwork to change the
beneficiary designations of her life insurance policy and pension, the
insurance companies distributed the proceeds to Alice's parents instead
of Betsy. Alice's parents are estranged from Betsy and refused to give
her the money.
Because Washington's superwill provision permits the testamentary
disposition of joint tenant bank accounts with right of survivorship and
revocable living trusts only, and not life insurance policies and pensions,
a court would not effectuate Alice's intent. She wanted the proceeds to
go to her sister rather than her parents and began the necessary steps to
make the change. Due to circumstances that were beyond her control, the
change was never made. A superwill provision encompassing all
revocable nonprobate assets would have enabled Alice to effectuate her
intent by permitting her to change the beneficiary of the policy to her
sister in a simple and quick manner.
This hypothetical illustrates that the legislature, by excluding life
insurance policies from the definition of "nonprobate asset," failed to
adopt a superwill provision that fully effectuates the testator's intent.
Thus, a life insurance policyholder receives no greater protection under
the superwill provision than under prior law. Despite the enactment of
the provision, a life insurance policyholder cannot effectively change the
beneficiary of the policy with his superwill.
Because the Washington legislature did not include life insurance
policies and other commonly used revocable will substitutes in the
definition of nonprobate assets, courts will still be forced to adhere to the
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rule of substantial compliance to validate a change in beneficiary
designation pursuant to a will. The outcome of Rice v. Life Insurance Co.
of North America'65 is indicative of how the courts will treat attempts to
change the beneficiary designation by will even after the Washington
legislature has adopted the superwill provision. In that case, the testator
failed to comply with the policy terms for changing the beneficiary of his
life insurance policy, so the court relied on the doctrine of substantial
compliance to recognize the change.'66
By relying on the doctrine of substantial compliance, courts attempt to
effectuate a testator's intent on a case-by-case basis, 67 which is not
always effective. When a testator on his deathbed decides to change the
beneficiary of his life insurance policy and does nothing more than
execute a will expressing that desire, the court will not recognize that
change because the testator did not substantially comply with the terms
of the policy for changing the beneficiary.'68 Even though the testator
manifested his intent to alter the terms of the policy by complying with
the requirements of the state's Statute of Wills,'69 the court would not
effectuate that intent because the testator was unable to comply with the
terms of the policy for expressing that intent. In situations such as these,
some courts state that the owner of the policy "had ample time and
opportunity to comply with the policy requirements."' 7 ° Even so, it is
possible that a person will procrastinate in making an intended change
until the final moments of his life.'7 ' Rather than focusing on when the
testator decided to alter his estate plan, the court should focus on the
testator's clearly manifested intent.
Although the underlying purpose of probate law is to effectuate the
testator's intent, Washington's superwill statute only partially achieves
165. 25 Wash. App. 479, 609 P.2d 1387 (1980).
166. See id. at 482, 609 P.2d at 1389.
167. See, e.g., id. (explaining that court looks to manifestation of particular testator's intent and to
actions of that testator to see if he has done everything possible to change beneficiary according to
terms of life insurance policy).
168. See Andersen, supra note 11, at 124. Having the superwill as an option would be helpful in
those circumstances when testators make wills to alter disposition of their nonprobate assets while
on their deathbeds. See id.
169. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of a typical Statute of Wills
and the requirements that the testator must meet to execute a valid will.
170. Cook v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 428 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. Ct App.
1981). "Surely, if Douglas had wanted to change the beneficiary he had ample time and opportunity
to comply with the policy requirements." Id. at 116.
171. See Andersen, supra note 11, at 124.
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that goal because it excludes such a large number of nonprobate assets
from its scope. The court's continued application of the substantial
compliance doctrine with respect to life insurance policies is an
illustration of how the statute falls short of meeting the underlying
purpose of probate law. 72
B. Proposed Changes to Washington's Superwill Statute
To facilitate the testator's power to dispose of his nonprobate assets,
and thus effectuate his intent, the legislature should broaden the
definition of nonprobate asset for purposes of this statute to include a
larger number of the generally recognized nonprobate assets. 73 Rather
than limiting the definition of nonprobate asset to include only joint
tenant bank accounts with right of survivorship and revocable living
trusts, the legislature should amend section 104(7)(a) of the superwill
statute to state: "Nonprobate asset includes any will substitute that
transfers an interest at the transferor's death pursuant to a revocable
beneficiary designation." This would broaden the scope of the statute to
encompass joint tenancies in personal property, joint bank accounts with
provisions for survivorship, revocable P.O.D. designations, life insurance
beneficiary designations, revocable inter vivos trusts, and retirement
benefits. This definition would better effectuate the testator's intent by
allowing him to alter the terms of any revocable will substitute.
The scope of the superwill statute should be broadened to encompass
a greater number of will substitutes than currently included; however, it
should encompass only revocable nonprobate assets because the
inclusion of irrevocable nonprobate assets would increase the testator's
power of disposition rather than merely facilitate the use of his existing
power. Because individuals cannot alter irrevocable nonprobate
beneficiary designations, the inclusion of such will substitutes in the
definition of nonprobate asset would expand a testator's power to dispose
of nonprobate assets.
If the hypothetical case posed above arose after such an amendment
was made to the superwill statute, Alice would have greater control over
the disposition of the proceeds of her life insurance policy and her
172. See Dubovich, supra note 5. "If possible, a will should be interpreted according to its terms
viewed in the light of the general circumstances surrounding the testator in order to effectuate his
intention." Id
173. See supra note 31 for a substantially complete list of nonprobate assets.
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pension. She would not have to research whom to call to request
paperwork to change the beneficiary designations. Rather, she could save
time and avoid confusion by executing a will with a provision that
changed the beneficiary designations from her parents to her sister. As
the hypothetical illustrates, the legislature should amend the definition of
nonprobate asset and provide the court with a statute that permits it to
effectuate better the testator's clearly manifested intent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Washington has taken a very important step in the evolution of
probate law by being the first state to enact a superwill statute. Although
the legislature had the right idea by drafting a statute intended to enhance
the testator's power to dispose of his nonprobate assets, it failed to draft
the statute broadly enough to achieve that goal. It may be courageous to
enact a statute that no other state is willing to adopt, but there is no point
in taking that step if the legislature is going to do it only halfheartedly.
The statute is drafted so narrowly that it will fail to help effectuate the
testator's intent in many situations. The scenario in which the testator
executes a deathbed will to alter the disposition of his nonprobate assets
is a compelling illustration of the limitations of Washington's superwill
provision.
The legislature should amend the definition of nonprobate asset as it
applies to the superwill. The legislature should draft a broader definition
of "nonprobate asset" so that the statute provides a convenient method
for the testator to manifest clearly his intent with respect to the
disposition of his estate. Until the legislature makes this change,
Washington's superwill provision will merely be a partial achievement
of the legislature's objective to enhance and facilitate the power of the
testator to control the disposition of his nonprobate assets. 74
174. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.11.003(1) (1998).
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